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Abstract The Stern Review added balanced growth equivalents (BGE) to the economic
climate change research agenda. We first propose rigorous definitions of the BGE for multiple
regions and under uncertainty. We show that the change in the BGE is independent of the
assumed scenario of per capita income. For comparable welfare economic assumptions as
the Stern Review, we calculate lower changes in BGE between a business as usual scenario
and one without climate impacts with the model FUND than the Stern Review found with
the model PAGE. We find that mitigation policies give even lower changes in BGE and
argue that those policy choices should be the focus of the research effort rather than total
damage estimates. According to our results, the current carbon tax should be below $55/tC.
Sensitivity analyses show that the Stern Review chose parameters that imply high impact
estimates. However, for regionally disaggregated welfare functions, we find changes in BGE
that are significantly higher than the results from the Stern Review, both for total damage as
for policy analysis. With regional disaggregation and high risk aversion, we observe fat tails
and with that very high welfare losses.
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1 Introduction
The Stern Review on the economics of Climate Change (Stern 2007) has caused substantial
discussion, not least about the validity of the headline conclusion that climate change would
cause a welfare loss equivalent to a permanent income loss of 5–20%. The initial responses
of many economists (Arrow 2007; Dasgupta 2007; Mendelsohn 2006; Nordhaus 2007a,b;
Pielke Jr 2007; Tol 2006b; Tol and Yohe forthcoming; Weitzman 2008; Yohe et al. 2007)
focused on a variety of shortcomings of the research and the choice of the rates of pure time
preference and risk aversion, but later reactions (Yohe and Tol 2007; Weitzman 2009) empha-
sized that the Stern Review has also brought renewed attention to the conceptual and moral
difficulties of any economic appraisal of projects to limit climate change and its impacts.
This paper contributes in four ways to the ongoing debate about the conclusions of the
Stern Review. First, this paper uses a different integrated assessment model and is thus a
sensitivity analysis of the conclusions of the Stern Review. Second, we extend the analysis
conducted by the Stern Review with a regionally disaggregated welfare module. Third, we
not only calculate the difference between scenarios with and without climate impacts, but
also evaluate specific policies in terms of changes in balanced growth equivalents. Fourth,
we propose a rigorous definition of the balanced growth equivalent, which was lacking from
the Stern Review.
The Stern Review diverged from the usual approaches of calculating the welfare impact of
climate change employed in the literature (Pearce et al. 1996; Smith et al. 2001) in a number
of ways. For one, it presented the results of its modeling exercise as changes in balanced
growth equivalents (cf. Mirrlees and Stern 1972). Previous studies of climate change had
presented economic damages as total impacts for a benchmark scenario (typically, the effect
of a doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide on today’s population and economy).1 The
introduction of a new measure is certainly a refreshing move, but it makes comparison with
previous results difficult. One could attempt to infer what the results from the Stern Review
are in the metrics used in previous studies. In this paper, we choose the other direction: We
use the welfare measure of the Stern Review but use the FUND model instead of PAGE.
As such, this paper analyses how the results from the Stern Review depend on the specific
assumptions made in the PAGE model. We also run the model with more combinations of
input parameters than the Stern Review did, in particular, we investigate sensitivity to all
IPCC SRES scenarios and more discounting schemes.
Mirrlees’ and Stern’s (1972) definition of the balanced growth equivalent is for a single
decision maker and a constant population. The Stern Review’s calculation of welfare mea-
sures is based on globally averaged per capita consumption and a growing population.2 The
Stern Review suggests that a more appropriate aggregation would take up regional data when
deriving the welfare measure. Due to time constraints, the Stern Review seems not to have
carried out those calculations. Here, we do use regional impacts, income, and population data
to estimate changes in the balanced growth equivalent due to climate change.
1 The marginal impacts according to the Stern Review can be compared to previous studies. Tol (2008) does
exactly that and finds that the Stern Review is an outlier.
2 The text in the Stern Review is not clear on this point and (Stern 2008, p. 18) claims that the welfare function
used for the Stern Review is a function of regional per capita consumption, but subsequent private commu-
nication (Simon Dietz) with the Stern Review team and a look at the source code that was used for the Stern
Review and provided to us in the meantime confirmed that the Stern Review operated with global and not
regional per capita consumption. Similar ambiguity is illustrated by the exchange on abatement costs between
Anderson (2007), Dietz et al. (2007), and Tol and Yohe (2006, 2007a). See also Weyant (2008).
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Finally, the Stern Review presented its results as differences between scenarios with no
impacts from climate change at all and scenarios with climate change impacts. This cannot
be regarded as an evaluation of policy options: there is no feasible policy option available
today to avoid all climate change impacts in the future. A more meaningful result is obtained
by looking at changes in welfare from feasible policy options. We here restrict the attention
to one climate policy, described in Section 4.3.
Section 2 reviews the original definition of the balanced growth equivalent and shows our
extension with non-constant populations, regional disaggregation, and uncertainty. While
our derivations are relatively straightforward, they have not been presented before. The
equations shown should avoid future ambiguities about the definition of the BGE and its
extensions. Section 3 outlines the FUND model. Section 4 presents the numerical results.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Balanced Growth Equivalent
2.1 Basic Concept
Mirrlees and Stern (1972) introduced the concept of a balanced growth equivalent (BGE)
as a commodity measure of welfare. The thought was that when looking at policy proposals
one could calculate the change in BGE for a particular policy and use that as a rough first
estimate of whether further investigation of that policy would be warranted or whether the
impact of that policy would be too small in the first place to warrant further research. The
authors themselves suggest that there might be many broad economic policy options unex-
plored that would cause an increase of at least 1% in BGE and propose that those should
attain more research time.3 The BGE as a welfare measure has largely been ignored in the
economics literature: only nine papers refer to Mirrlees and Stern (1972) according to the
Web of Science, and none of these papers develops the BGE further or applies it. Stern (2007)
appears to be the first application.
The following will briefly review the original concept with the notation used for this
paper. Since we will later use a numerical model to run simulations, we use discrete time
for the model, unlike the original specification of BGE. One key exercise of this paper is
to compare the effects of various policy options with respect to climate change in terms of
welfare changes. Policy choices are represented by ω. A specific policy choice ω could for
example designate one specific carbon tax schedule. ω can stand for any policy out of all
possible policy options, the numerical analysis later in the paper will restrict itself to a subset
of policy options.
Let welfare for a specific policy ω be
W (ω) =
T∑
t=0
U
(
Cω,t
)
Pt (1 + ρ)−t (1)
where Cω,t is per capita consumption at time t as it results from choosing policy ω, P is
population, ρ is the utility discount rate, U is the utility function and T is the time up to
which the analysis is carried out.
3 Note that the Stern Review and this paper use a different baseline than was originally suggested in
Mirrlees and Stern (1972). They looked at improvements from the status quo, i.e., how a policy would improve
the business as usual scenario. The Stern Review and this paper evaluate changes from a hypothetical world
without climate change, where smaller changes (i.e., smaller damages) are better.
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The BGE for policy ω is then defined by solving4
T∑
t=0
U
[
γ (ω) (1 + α)t ] Pt (1 + ρ)−t = W (ω) (2)
for γ (ω), with α being a constant growth rate (that later drops out when changes in γ are
calculated). Note that γ (ω) is the initial level of per capita consumption that would give the
same welfare as W(ω) if it grew at constant rate α.
For a standard constant-relative-risk-aversion utility function
U (C) =
{
C1−η (1 − η)−1 for η = 1
ln C for η = 1 (3)
with η being the marginal elasticity of consumption, we have an explicit solution for γ
γ (ω) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
[(1 − η) W (ω)] 11−η
[∑T
t=0
(1+α)t(1−η) Pt
(1+ρ)t
]− 11−η for η = 1
exp
(
W (ω)−ln(1+α)∑Tt=0 t Pt (1+ρ)−t∑T
t=0 Pt (1+ρ)−t
)
for η = 1
(4)
Defining the relative change in BGE for two policies ω and ω’ as γ , we get
γ := γ
(
ω′
) − γ (ω)
γ (ω)
=
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(
W(ω′)
W (ω)
) 1
1−η − 1 for η = 1
exp
(
W(ω′)−W (ω)∑T
t=0 Pt (1+ρ)−t
)
− 1 for η = 1
(5)
Note that γ is independent of α, so that the change in BGE does not depend on the
growth rate assumed in the calculation of a specific BGE—as long as the growth rates are the
same for the two policy choices. The change in BGE thus expresses the difference between
two scenarios as a constant change in relative consumption. It is an annuity, but an annuity
that is based on the equivalence of net present welfare.
Note that population is (assumed to be) independent of the policy choice. If population is
endogenous to the policy decision, one cannot use a welfare function like Eq. 1. See Blackorby
and Donaldson (1984) and Blackorby et al. (1995).
2.2 Uncertainty
We now treat W (ω, s) as a random variable where p(s) is the probability of state of the
world s. Expected welfare then is
EW (ω) =
∑
p
p (ω, s)
T∑
t=0
U
(
Cω,s,t
)
Pt (1 + ρ)−t (6)
4 Note that Eq. 7 in Chap. 6 in the Stern Review purports to define the BGE as used by (Stern 2007 p. 185)
and thus would play the same role as our Eq. 2. Unfortunately, Eq. 7 in the review contains a number of errors:
as printed, the function is not defined for η = 1, a balanced growth path is given by CBGE (1 + g)t and
not the term CBGE + gt that is printed in the Stern Review, and finally this wrong term for consumption at
time t is wrongly converted into utility by only putting CBGE into the utility function and then adding gt to
utility. Private communication with members of the Stern Review team (Simon Dietz, Nick Stern) and later
comparison with the source code (also provided privately) used for the Stern Review assured us that these
errors were only present in the text and that the equations used for the numerical results in the Stern Review
did not contain these mistakes. Public availability of the source code and an errata (which we could not find)
of the Stern Review could clear questions up for other readers of the Stern Review.
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The certainty- and balanced growth equivalent (CBGE) is obtained be replacing W (ω) in
(2) with expected welfare EW (ω) as defined in (6). The CBGE can then be solved as:
γC (ω) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
[(1 − η) EW (ω)] 11−η
[∑T
t=0
(1+α)t(1−η) Pt
(1+ρ)t
]− 11−η for η = 1
exp
(
EW (ω)−ln(1+α)∑Tt=0 t Pt (1+ρ)−t∑T
t=0 Pt (1+ρ)−t
)
for η = 1
(7)
The CBGE is the initial level of per capita consumption, which, if it grows without any
uncertainty at some constant rate α, gives the same level of welfare as the expected welfare
for some policy ω as defined in (6). It is a combination of the certainty equivalence ideas put
forward by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) with the balanced growth equivalent of Mirrlees
and Stern (1972).
The change in the CBGE equals:
γC :=
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
(EW(ω′)
EW (ω)
) 1
1−η − 1 for η = 1
exp
(
EW(ω′)−EW (ω)∑T
t=0 Pt (1+ρ)−t
)
− 1 for η = 1
(8)
As before, the growth scenario α cancels.
2.3 Multiple Regions
In the final step, we introduce multiple regions. Assuming that the global welfare function is
utilitarian, we have
WE (ω) =
∑
r
T∑
t=0
U
(
Cω,t,r
)
Pt,r (1 + ρ)−t (9)
for a deterministic analysis and
EWE (ω) =
∑
p
p (ω, s)
∑
r
T∑
t=0
U
(
Cω,s,t,r
)
Pt,r (1 + ρ)−t (10)
for an analysis with uncertainty. Per capita consumption C and population P are now fed
into the welfare function for each region r individually.
Replacing W (ω) in (2) with the deterministic welfare function that is disaggregated by
regions WE (ω) gives the equity- and balanced growth equivalent (EBGE) for a specific policy
choice. This solves as:
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γE (ω) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
[(1 − η) WE (ω)]
1
1−η
[∑T
t=0
(1+α)t(1−η) Pt
(1+ρ)t
]− 11−η for η = 1
exp
(
WE (ω)−ln(1+α)∑Tt=0 t Pt (1+ρ)−t∑T
t=0 Pt (1+ρ)−t
)
for η = 1
(11)
This combines the BGE concept with a measure of inequality very much like Atkinson
(1970). The EBGE is the equally distributed (over the regions under consideration) initial
per capita consumption, growing at a constant rate α that gives the same level of welfare as
obtained for a specific policy choice ω from the welfare function defined in (9). Note that (11)
has a different treatment for income difference between regions and between generations (cf.
Tol 2002c).
The certainty, equity- and balanced growth equivalent (CEBGE) follows by replacing
W (ω) in (2) with the expected welfare from the regional disaggregated welfare function as
defined in (10) for some policy choice ω. This solves as:
γC E (ω) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
[(1 − η) EWE (ω)]
1
1−η
[∑T
t=0
(1+α)t(1−η) Pt
(1+ρ)t
]− 11−η for η = 1
exp
(
EWE (ω)−ln(1+α)∑Tt=0 t Pt (1+ρ)−t∑T
t=0 Pt (1+ρ)−t
)
for η = 1
(12)
which is the equally distributed (over the regions under consideration) initial per capita con-
sumption growing without uncertainty at a constant rate α, that gives the same welfare level
as the expected welfare of a certain policy choice ω as obtained by using (10).
From this it follows that the change in the EBGE between two policy options is
γE :=
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(
WE(ω′)
WE (ω)
) 1
1−η − 1 for η = 1
exp
(
WE(ω′)−WE (ω)∑T
t=0 Pt (1+ρ)−t
)
− 1 for η = 1
(13)
And the change in the CEBGE between two policy options is
γC E :=
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
(EWE(ω′)
EWE (ω)
) 1
1−η − 1 for η = 1
exp
(
EWE(ω′)−EWE (ω)∑T
t=0 Pt (1+ρ)−t
)
− 1 for η = 1
(14)
Note that in Eq. 14, the parameter η has a triple role. It is a measure of the curvature of
the utility function—more specifically, the consumption elasticity of marginal utility—but it
functions as the intertemporal substitution elasticity of consumption, the rate of risk aversion,
and the rate of inequity aversion. Below, we refer to η as the rate of risk aversion.
Tol and Yohe (2007b) show a similar derivation, but use the term certainty- and equity-
equivalent annuity because Eq. 14 distributes the impact equally over time, as well as over
states of the world and over regions.
As stated in the introduction, we think that the Stern Review intended to report γC E as
defined in Eq. 14, but they seem to report γC (8) instead.
3 The Model
FUND (the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation, and Distribution) is an inte-
grated assessment model linking projections of populations, economic activity and emissions
to a simple carbon cycle and climate model, and to a model predicting and monetizing welfare
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impacts. Climate change welfare impacts are monetarized in 1995 dollars and are modeled
over 16 regions. Modeled welfare impacts include agriculture, forestry, sea level rise, cardio-
vascular and respiratory disorders influenced by cold and heat stress, malaria, dengue fever,
schistosomiasis, diarrhoea, energy consumption, water resources, and unmanaged ecosys-
tems (Link and Tol 2004). The source code, data, and a technical description of the model
can be found at http://www.fund-model.org.
Essentially, FUND consists of a set of exogenous scenarios and endogenous perturbations.
The model distinguishes 16 major regions of the world, viz. the United States of America,
Canada, Western Europe, Japan and South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, Central and
Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, Central America, South America,
South Asia, Southeast Asia, China, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Small Island
States. Version 3.2, used in this paper, runs from 1,950 to 2,300 in time steps of one year.
The primary reason for starting in 1950 is to initialize the climate change impact module. In
FUND, the welfare impacts of climate change are assumed to depend in part on the impacts
during the previous year, reflecting the process of adjustment to climate change. Because the
initial values to be used for the year 1950 cannot be approximated very well, both physical
impacts and monetized welfare impacts of climate change tend to be misrepresented in the
first few decades of the model runs. The 22nd and 23rd centuries are included to provide a
proper long-term perspective.
The period of 1950–1990 is used for the calibration of the model, which is based on the
IMAGE 100-year database (Batjes and Goldewijk 1994). The period 1990–2000 is based
on observations (http://earthtrends.wri.org). The 2000–2010 period is interpolated from the
immediate past. The climate scenarios for the period 2010–2100 are based on the EMF14
Standardized Scenario, which lies somewhere in between IS92a and IS92f (Leggett et al.
1992). The period 2100–2300 is extrapolated.
The scenarios are defined by varied rates of population growth, economic growth, auton-
omous energy efficiency improvements, and decarbonization of energy use (autonomous
carbon efficiency improvements), as well as by emissions of carbon dioxide from land use
change, methane emissions, and nitrous oxide emissions.
Emission reduction of carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide is specified as in Tol
(2006a). Simple cost curves are used for the economic impact of abatement, with limited
scope for endogenous technological progress and interregional spillovers (Tol 2005).
The scenarios of economic growth are perturbed by the effects of climatic change.5
Climate-induced migration between the regions of the world causes the population sizes to
change. Immigrants are assumed to assimilate immediately and completely with the respec-
tive host population.
The tangible welfare impacts are dead-weight losses to the economy. Consumption and
investment are reduced without changing the savings rate. As a result, climate change reduces
long-term economic growth, although consumption is particularly affected in the short-term.
Economic growth is also reduced by carbon dioxide abatement measures. The energy inten-
sity of the economy and the carbon intensity of the energy supply autonomously decrease
over time. This process can be accelerated by abatement policies.
The endogenous parts of FUND consist of the atmospheric concentrations of carbon
dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide, the global mean temperature, the effect of carbon diox-
ide emission reductions on the economy and on emissions, and the effect of the damages
on the economy caused by climate change. Methane and nitrous oxide are taken up in
5 Note that in the standard version of FUND population growth is also perturbed by climate change impacts.
That particular feature was switched off in the runs for this paper because endogenous population changes
cannot be evaluated with the kind of welfare function investigated, see discussion above.
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the atmosphere, and then geometrically depleted. The atmospheric concentration of carbon
dioxide, measured in parts per million by volume, is represented by the five-box model of
Maier-Reimer and Hasselmann (1987). Its parameters are taken from Hammitt et al. (1992).
The radiative forcing of carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and sulphur aerosols is
determined based on (Shine et al. 1990). The global mean temperature, T , is governed by a
geometric build-up to its equilibrium (determined by the radiative forcing, RF), with a half-
life of 50 years. In the base case, the global mean temperature rises in equilibrium by 2.5◦C
for a doubling of carbon dioxide equivalents. Regional temperature is derived by multiply-
ing the global mean temperature by a fixed factor, which corresponds to the spatial climate
change pattern averaged over 14 GCMs (Mendelsohn et al. 2000). The global mean sea level
is also geometric, with its equilibrium level determined by the temperature and a half-life
of 50 years. Both temperature and sea level are calibrated to correspond to the best guess
temperature and sea level for the IS92a scenario of Kattenberg et al. (1996).
The climate welfare impact module, based on Tol (2002a,b) includes the following catego-
ries: agriculture, forestry, hurricanes, sea level rise, cardiovascular and respiratory disorders
related to cold and heat stress, malaria, dengue fever, schistosomiasis, diarrhoea, energy
consumption, water resources, and unmanaged ecosystems. Climate change related damages
are triggered by either the rate of temperature change (benchmarked at 0.04◦C/year) or the
level of temperature change (benchmarked at 1.0◦C). Damages from the rate of temperature
change slowly fade, reflecting adaptation (cf. Tol 2002b).
In the model individuals can die prematurely due to temperature stress or vector-borne
diseases, or they can migrate because of sea level rise. Like all welfare impacts of climate
change, these effects are monetized. The value of a statistical life is set to be 200 times the
annual per capita income.6 The resulting value of a statistical life lies in the middle of the
observed range of values in the literature (cf. Cline 1992). The value of emigration is set to
be three times the per capita income (Tol 1995, 1996), the value of immigration is 40% of
the per capita income in the host region (Cline 1992). Losses of dryland and wetlands due to
sea level rise are modeled explicitly. The monetary value of a loss of one square kilometer
of dryland was on average $4 million in OECD countries in 1990 (cf. Fankhauser 1994).
Dryland value is assumed to be proportional to GDP per square kilometer. Wetland losses are
valued at $2 million per square kilometer on average in the OECD in 1990 (cf. Fankhauser
1994). The wetland value is assumed to have a logistic relation to per capita income. Coastal
protection is based on cost-benefit analysis, including the value of additional wetland lost
due to the construction of dikes and subsequent coastal squeeze.
Other welfare impact categories, such as agriculture, forestry, hurricanes, energy, water,
and ecosystems, are directly expressed in monetary values without an intermediate layer of
impacts measured in their ‘natural’ units (cf. Tol 2002a). Modeled effects of climate change
on energy consumption, agriculture, and cardiovascular and respiratory diseases explicitly
recognize that there is a climatic optimum, which is determined by a variety of factors, includ-
ing plant physiology and the behavior of farmers. Impacts are positive or negative depending
on whether the actual climate conditions are moving closer to or away from that optimum
climate. Impacts are larger if the initial climate conditions are further away from the opti-
mum climate. The optimum climate is of importance with regard to the potential impacts.
The actual impacts lag behind the potential impacts, depending on the speed of adapta-
tion. The impacts of not being fully adapted to new climate conditions are always negative
(cf. Tol 2002b).
6 Note that this implies that the monetary value of health risk is effectively discounted with the pure rate of
time preference rather than with the consumption rate of discount (Horowitz 2002). It also implies that, after
equity weighing, the value of a statistical life is equal across the world (Fankhauser et al. 1997).
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The welfare impacts of climate change on coastal zones, forestry, hurricanes, unman-
aged ecosystems, water resources, diarrhoea, malaria, dengue fever, and schistosomiasis are
modeled as simple power functions. Impacts are either negative or positive, and they do not
change sign (cf. Tol 2002b).
Vulnerability to climate change changes with population growth, economic growth, and
technological progress. Some systems are expected to become more vulnerable, such as water
resources (with population growth) and heat-related disorders (with urbanization), or more
valuable, such as ecosystems and health (with higher per capita incomes). Other systems
are projected to become less vulnerable, such as energy consumption (with technological
progress), agriculture (with economic growth) and vector- and water-borne diseases (with
improved health care) (cf. Tol 2002b).
In the Monte Carlo analyses, essentially all parameters are varied. The probability density
functions are mostly based on expert guesses, but where possible “objective” estimates were
used. Parameters are assumed to vary independently of one another, except when there are
calibration or accounting constraints. Details of the Monte Carlo analysis can be found on
FUND’s website at http://www.fund-model.org.
4 Results
4.1 Scenarios
Stern (2007) present the impacts of climate change as the change in BGE between a base-
line scenario with no climate change impacts and various scenarios with climate impacts.
This is a measure of the overall damage of climate change. We present similar results but
add more sensitivity analysis. In particular, we present results for alternative assumptions on
discounting and risk aversion, and include four alternative socio-economic scenarios.
We refer to these runs as total damage estimates. Contrary to what Stern (2007) assert,
these estimates of the total impact of climate change differ from the estimated benefits of
climate policy. Avoiding all climate change is impossible, and emission abatement slows
economic growth. We therefore present a second set of results where we evaluate specific
carbon taxation policies and calculate the change in BGE (or any of the more complicated
concepts) from a hypothetical scenario with neither climate change impacts nor any policy
costs to a scenario with both policy costs of carbon taxation and impacts of climate change.
For any combination of socio economic scenario, pure rate of time preference, rate of risk
aversion, uncertainty treatment and social welfare function, we calculated the BGE for two
policy choices: One business as usual policy with no greenhouse gas taxation and the BGE
for a particular policy choice. The latter is characterized as follows: Following a widely used
practise, we impose a globally harmonized carbon tax on all regions. For the first time period,
we search for a carbon tax rate that equals the social cost of carbon emissions, which in turn
depends on the choice and parameterization of the social welfare function. We then increase
this carbon tax with the world average discount rate in every time period.7 We then present
7 Note that this ignores a number of complicated issues. First, the rate of increase of the optimal carbon
tax would be less than the discount rate due to the decay of carbon in the atmosphere. In our experience
the difference in results between the two approaches is marginal and would not have justified the significant
computational complications associated with it. Second, there is an ongoing debate in the literature whether a
harmonized carbon tax is optimal (cf. Chichilinisky and Heal 1994; Anthoff 2009), but we ignore these issues
in this paper.
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Fig. 1 Total damage as a change in BGE with a global welfare function
results as a change in the BGE from a run without any climate change impacts or policy costs
to the BGE of one of the two policy choices.
In the following sections, we point out our key findings both for the total damage runs
and the policy runs.
4.2 Total Damage
Figure 1 shows the loss of going from a scenario without climate change impacts to a business
as usual policy (i.e., a scenario with no climate change mitigation but full impacts) in terms of
change of CBGE for various pure rates of time preference, risk aversion and socio-economic
scenario choices. Figure 1 shows the mean change in BGE over all socio-economic scenarios,
with the minimum and maximum shown on the error bars. The numbers in this figure form
the model sensitivity analysis to the results of the Stern Review.
In general, the numbers calculated by FUND tend to suggest lower total damages than the
figures from the Stern Review, given apparently comparable welfare economic treatment.8
One difference is that FUND has a time horizon of 2300, while PAGE stops at 2200. In
the Stern Review impacts were assumed to be constant as a fraction of income for the time
period 2200 to infinity and fully accounted for in the welfare function, whereas we assume
no impacts after 2300. Note that the very questionable assumption of constant damages until
infinity after the year 2200 is not a feature of the PAGE model, but was only implemented for
the results of the Stern Review, as far as we can tell. Probably the main driver for this effect is
one crucial difference in modeling impacts in the model PAGE as used for the Stern Review
and FUND: PAGE puts more emphasis on the negative impacts of climate change, i.e., it will
rarely produce a net global benefit from an increase in temperature for any time step.9 FUND
on the other hand has various sectors in which modest temperature increases in some regions
can lead to net benefits, so that in particular in the earlier time periods impacts of climate
change are positive for some regions.10 Besides, PAGE includes an arbitrary catastrophe
8 Note that PAGE tends to report lower marginal impacts than FUND (Tol 2008).
9 Note that PAGE does produce positive market impacts for some regions.
10 Initially positive economic impacts of climate change are not unique to FUND, and are not a new finding.
See Smith et al. (2001). For detailed discussions of FUND’s estimated impacts and in particular their time
profile as well as their regional distribution, see Tol (2002b) and Tol et al. (2003).
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Fig. 2 Total damage with a regional welfare function
caused by climate change, while FUND only includes identified impacts—which does not
imply that FUND cannot produce very large impacts (Tol 2003) or analyze supposedly cat-
astrophic scenarios (Link and Tol 2004). Furthermore, PAGE assumes that vulnerability to
climate change is constant, while FUND has that regions grow less vulnerable as they grow
richer. Sterner and Perrsson (2008) and Tol and Yohe (2007b) show that this is an important
assumption.
At the same time, our results mimic some key features of the Stern Review results: higher
time preference rates and higher risk aversion always lead to lower impacts estimates. For
time discounting, this is rather well established in the literature (e.g., Guo et al. 2006; Newell
and Pizer 2003). That higher η values lead to lower damages is less straight forward, as it
controls two effects at the same time. First, the effective discount rate is increased, which
certainly leads to lower damage estimates. Second, more weight is given to unlikely but bad
outcomes, i.e., the decision maker is assumed to be more risk averse, which should lead to
higher damage estimates. Figure 1 shows that the first effect strongly dominates the second in
the kind of uncertainty analysis employed for this paper, i.e., that the increase in the discount
rate offsets the increase in risk aversion.
The Stern Review itself pointed out that a global welfare function cannot take into account
how damages are distributed with respect to high/low income regions, and that a regional
disaggregated welfare function would be a more appropriate choice. Figure 2 shows results
using a social welfare function that is disaggregated into 16 world regions, again with the
mean (and minimum and maximum) of the socio-economic scenarios for a costless mitigation
policy.
There are three key insights: first, using a disaggregated regional social welfare function
always increases total damage estimates; second, the role of η is reversed; and third, high η
values lead to estimates that are very large.
We find higher damages for a regional disaggregated welfare function for all scenarios. A
disaggregated regional welfare function in general gives higher weights to impacts in poor
regions than in high income regions. In general (but not in every detail), FUND has more
negative impacts in poor regions, so this result is not unexpected.
With a regional welfare function, η plays a third role, namely that of inequality aversion,
in addition to the parameter of risk aversion and substitution of consumption over time. With
this third role added, the response of the total damage estimates to higher values for η is
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Table 1 Change in CBGE and CEBGE from a scenario without climate impacts to a mitigation policy scenario
(to a business as usual scenario in brackets) for SRES scenario A2
η = 1.0 η = 1.5 η = 2.0
Global welfare function (%)
ρ = 0.1 1.33% (3.27%) 0.85% (2.40%) 0.40% (1.49%)
ρ = 1.0 0.40% (1.55%) 0.19% (0.92%) 0.08% (0.46%)
ρ = 3.0 0.01% (0.03%) 0.02% (−0.07%) 0.01% (-0.14%)
Regional welfare function (%)
ρ = 0.1 4.27% (9.24%) 27.86% (32.60%) 91.07% (91.67%)
ρ = 1.0 1.52% (5.12%) 9.74% (13.95%) 70.58% (72.11%)
ρ = 3.0 0.08% (1.56%) 0.61% (3.29%) 10.25% (13.73%)
reversed, in particular the inequality and risk aversion aspect dominate the higher discount
rate aspect of high η values and therefore total damage estimates increase with higher values
for η. This directly points to one central problem with the kind of welfare function commonly
employed in climate change analysis (and this paper), namely the over use of η to control
three issues at the same time (cf. Beckerman and Hepburn 2007). A number of the critics
of the Stern Review (e.g., Dasgupta 2007) have argued that while a low pure rate of time
preference might be acceptable, one should pick a higher value for η, so that the overall
discount rate is more in line with market interest rates. In the context of a global welfare
function as used by Stern (2007) this suggestion makes sense, but with a regional welfare
function the effect on the estimated damage may be unexpected.
Finally, we produce very large damage estimates for high η values with a regional welfare
function. This is a direct manifestation of Weitzman (2009) fat tail argument: comparing the
regional probabilistic results with deterministic runs, and a detailed analysis of the drivers of
those extreme values shows that some regions approach very low consumption (subsistence)
levels in some scenarios in our Monte Carlo analysis—and this implies that welfare in these
regions, years and runs becomes large and negative, and potentially unboundedly so. With a
global welfare function those extreme results in a few regions are averaged out, but with a
regional welfare function these fat tails in single regions drive the analysis.
4.3 Mitigation Policy
While an analysis of the total expected damage of climate change is of interest, a more policy
relevant question is what improvement a realistic policy that would have both mitigation
costs and avoided damage benefits accounted for could achieve.
Table 1 compares the total damage of a scenario with no emission mitigation with the total
damage of our mitigation policy scenario (in which case the total damage includes the now
reduced impacts from climate change as well as the mitigation costs) for SRES scenario A2
for a probabilistic analysis. The A2 scenario is the scenario of choice in the Stern Review.
For a global welfare function as used by the Stern Review, the best possible improvement
is always significantly lower than the total damage estimate. Except for runs with high η
values, this conclusion also holds for a regional welfare function. The runs with η = 2 have
to be interpreted with care, since the manifestation of fat-tails showing up there might make
the framework used to determine our policy response less appropriate.
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Table 2 Carbon tax ($/tC in 1995 USD) in the year 2000 for SRES A2 scenario under a probabilistic analysis
for the mitigation policy
η = 1.0 (%) η = 1.5 (%) η = 2.0 (%)
Global welfare function(%)
ρ = 0.1 40.63 23.75 11.88
ρ = 1.0 15.63 6.88 3.13
ρ = 3.0 0.63 0.63 0.63
Regional welfare function (%)
ρ = 0.1 51.25 54.38 50.63
ρ = 1.0 21.25 25.63 31.25
ρ = 3.0 2.50 6.88 7.50
A global welfare function underestimates by a large margin the improvements that can
be obtained by an actual mitigation policy. Table 2 compares the carbon tax levels in the
year 2000 for the A2 scenario. Note the discrepancy in the results. While our total impact
estimate is 3% for η = 1 and ρ = 0.1% compared to Stern’s 5%, our social cost of carbon
is $41/tC compared to Stern’s $314/tC. This is probably explained by the highly non-linear
impact function in the (adjusted) PAGE model. While the initial tax is higher for a regional
welfare function, the change in the BGE for a regional welfare function is much larger for
the mitigation policy than the change in the tax level. The prime reason for this is that the
introduction of a regional welfare function not only gives more weight to damages in low
income regions, but also mitigation costs in poor regions also get a higher weight, thereby
balancing the effect of the regional welfare function somewhat.
Table 3 highlights the importance of distributional issues and uncertainty in climate change.
Table 3 shows our estimate of the total impacts of climate change using a global welfare func-
tion ignoring uncertainty and compares this to the regional welfare function. In the global
welfare function, global average impacts are computed before being converted to utility.
In the regional welfare function, regional average impacts are converted to utility and then
averaged for the world. Irrespective of the rates of pure time preference or risk aversion, the
regional welfare function implies impacts that are substantially higher. This is well-known in
the literature (Azar and Sterner 1996; Fankhauser et al. 1997; Azar 1999; Anthoff et al. 2009).
It appears that the Stern Review overlooked this. With uncertainty, the difference between a
global and a regional welfare function is even stronger.
Qualitatively, the results for the A2 scenario hold for the other scenarios as well. Quan-
titatively, the results are different, of course, and where the relationship is ambiguous (e.g.,
between η and γ ), different scenarios may show different signs. Table 4 shows the total
impact of climate change for five alternative socio-economic and emissions scenarios. The
A2 scenario is generally in the middle of the range. Hotter (FUND) and poorer (B2) scenarios
show higher impacts, while cooler (B1) and richer (A1b) scenarios show lower impacts.
5 Conclusion
This paper defines various balanced growth equivalences, and applies them to compute the
impacts of climate change and the benefits of emission reduction with the integrated assess-
ment model FUND. We conduct a wider sensitivity analysis than run by the Stern Review.
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Table 3 Change in BGE and EBGE for total damage estimates for a business as usual scenario for SRES
scenario A2 without uncertainty
η = 1.0 (%) η = 1.5 (%) η = 2.0 (%)
Global welfare function (%)
ρ = 0.1 1.53 0.59 −0.15
ρ = 1.0 0.07 −0.46 −0.76
ρ = 3.0 −0.92 −0.95 −0.95
Regional welfare function (%)
ρ = 0.1 3.05 2.67 2.48
ρ = 1.0 1.06 1.20 1.72
ρ = 3.0 −0.51 0.40 1.42
Table 4 Total damages for probabilistic runs by socio economic scenario
η = 1.0 (%) η = 1.5 (%) η = 2.0 (%)
ρ = 0.1% ρ = 1.0% ρ = 3.0% ρ = 0.1% ρ = 1.0% ρ = 3.0% ρ = 0.1% ρ = 1.0% ρ = 3.0%
Global welfare function
FUND 4.50 2.25 0.23 3.45 1.45 0.06 2.24 0.80 −0.05
A1b 1.49 0.49 −0.20 0.56 0.02 −0.28 −0.01 −0.21 −0.32
A2 3.27 1.55 0.03 2.40 0.92 −0.07 1.49 0.46 −0.14
B1 0.09 −0.16 −0.32 −0.13 −0.26 −0.33 −0.25 −0.30 −0.33
B2 3.42 1.57 −0.01 2.59 0.97 −0.11 1.66 0.49 −0.19
Regional welfare function
FUND 11.30 6.45 1.89 37.26 18.28 4.14 92.74 78.66 24.20
A1b 4.83 2.54 0.94 14.87 5.38 1.97 80.28 44.69 5.72
A2 9.24 5.12 1.56 32.60 13.95 3.29 91.67 72.11 13.73
B1 1.92 1.22 0.70 2.39 1.98 1.77 3.42 3.04 2.99
B2 8.35 4.46 1.40 25.60 11.02 3.03 88.74 65.82 12.00
We find that the impacts of climate change are sensitive to the pure rate of time preference,
the rate of risk aversion, the level of spatial disaggregation, the inclusion of uncertainty, and
the socio-economic scenario. Our results span a wider range in both directions compared to
the Stern Review, thereby questioning the assertion that the high results obtained by the Stern
Review are robust. We find that the guess of the Stern Review that a regional welfare function
might increase overall damage estimates by a quarter (Stern 2007, p. 187) is very conserva-
tive. In our runs, the introduction of a regional welfare function, in particular in combination
with a high risk aversion, has a much larger effect on the results. Finally, we show that the
Stern Review was wrong to equate the impact of climate change and the benefits of emission
reduction—their “optimal” climate policy does not maximize welfare in the mathematical
sense of the word. Qualitatively, this was known. Quantitatively, we show that this is a big
mistake.
The results also show areas that need more research work. This includes improved socio-
economic and climate scenarios, and better and more complete estimates of the impacts of
climate change. In particular, disentangling intertemporal substitution from risk aversion and
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inequality aversion is a high priority (e.g., Carlsson et al. 2005). With only one parameter
to control three important effects, as commonly used in climate policy analysis, model- and
scenario-specific ambiguities emerge. The fat tails that showed up in some of our results with
high risk aversion and a regional welfare function are another area for further research.
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